社会偏好、信息结构和合同选择--多代理人的委托代理实验研究

Social Preferences,Information Structure and Contract Selection——A Principal-agent Experiment with Multiple Agents

本文报告了一个包含多个代理人的委托代理实验,其特点在于委托人拥有是否公开合同信息的权利以及不同代理人的劳动生产率不同。通过对合同选择、执行和结果的分析,本文发现:委托人更倾向于在不同代理人之间隐藏合同信息或者提供更为相近的合同;委托代理双方的礼物交换效应非常明显,但是其程度受到纵向不公平、信息结构和竞争因素的影响,而导致这些结果的根源在于部分经济个体表现出的公平考虑等社会偏好。这个结论对于我们更好地理解现实合同问题具有参考意义。

This paper reports an experiment with one principal and multiple agents, the features of which are that theprincipal has the right to make contract information observable or unobservable to all agents and these agents have unequal productivity. By analyzing the selection, implementation and results of these contracts, this paper finds that the principal tends to make contracts unobservable or provide more similar contracts. Also, this paper finds that gift exchange effect between the principal and the agent is very prominent, although the level is affected by vertical unfairness, information structure and competition. The main reason leading to these results is that some individuals have social preferences such as fair consideration. This conclusion can help us understand contracts in the economic society.