“农超对接”模式中质量控制力度的研究

Study on Quality Control in the Model of "Connecting Agriculture with Supermarkets"

在"农超对接"模式下,供应商和超市以最大化期望收益为目标进行质量控制,此时与质量控制力度相关的因素有:监管检测程度、处罚力度、价格激励、控制技术水平。应用"委托—代理"理论进行博弈分析,证明在质量可追溯下,通过加强各环节检测的强度、加大对不合格产品的处罚力度、运用价格激励高质量的农产品、提升企业质量控制的技术水平,能够增强各环节的质量控制力度,更好地保证农产品质量。

In the model of ＂ Connecting Agriculture with Supermarkets＂, in order to maximize the expected profit, the supplier and supermarket will increase their quality control, and relevant factors are ： the degree of supervision and punishment, price incentives, technical level of quality control. This paper proves that we can improve the quality control and better ensure the quality of agricultural products by strengthening the inspection, increasing penalty for non - conforming products, stimulating high - quality agricultural products and improving enterprise quality control technology in the condition of quality traceability.