企业合作与非合作并行研发模式下政府补贴策略研究

Study of Government Subsidy Strategy under the Enterprise's Cooperation and Non-cooperation Parallel R&D Pattern

针对企业创新过程中存在的合作与非合作研发并行的情形,构建一个三阶段博弈模型,分析政府补贴方式对并行研发模式下均衡的影响。通过对比分析政府仅对合作研发补贴和仅对非合作研发补贴时研发投入、产量、利润、补贴率和社会福利,发现政府对非合作研发补贴情形下的产量、利润和社会福利更高,而相应的补贴率则更低,表明政府对非合作研发补贴的绩效更高。

Concerning the cooperation and non - cooperation parallel R＆D pattern in the process of enterprise innovation, this article constructs a three - stage game model to analyze the influence of government subsidy pattern on the parallel R＆D pattern. Through contrastive analysis of the R＆D investment, output, profit, subsidy rate and social welfare of the subsidy in cooperation R＆D and non - cooperation R＆D, we find that the output, profit and social welfare are higher with government subsidy in non - cooperation R＆D ; correspondingly, the subsidy rate is lower. The results indicate that performance of the govemment; subsidy in non - cooperation R＆D is higher.