回购激励和广告投入下的供应链协调研究

Research on the Supply Chain Coordination of the Incentive Buyback Contract and Advertising Investment

在假设零售商的广告投入能提高需求期望但不会增加需求方差的前提下,以供应链的最大期望利润为目标,针对由单一供应商和单一零售商所组成的两级供应链,运用Stackelberg博弈方法,分别研究了在有无广告投入的条件下,集中式和分散式决策两种模式下的零售商的最优订货量和最佳广告投入的决策,并探讨了供应商销售奖励的回购契约协调机制。研究发现:一是在一定条件下,广告投入能增加供应链上各个主体的利润,从而增加供应链整体利润;二是在有广告投入情况下,供应商销售奖励的回购契约在分散决策时能够协调整个供应链。

Assuming that the retailer＇s advertising investment can improve the demand expectation but not increase demand variance,in a single vendor and a single retailer composed of two levels of the supply chain,aiming at maxing the supply chain expected profit,using two-echelon Stackelberg game method,under with and without advertising investment conditions,centralized and decentralized decision making two modes of optimal order quantity and retailer best advertising investment decisions were studied,and the repurchase contract supplier sales reward coordination mechanism were discussed.This study found：under certain conditions,advertising investment can increase in supply of each subject,thereby increasing the whole supply chain profits profit;in their advertising investment circumstances,suppliers sales reward buybacks contract in scattered decisions can coordinate the whole supply chain.