社区共享资源自发供给的异质性效应分析被引量：1

Analysis of the Heterogeneity Effect in Spontaneous Supply of Community Sharing Resource

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摘要用社区成员在共享资源总量中所占份额来表征个体异质性,构建异质性与集体行动实现的解析模型进行均衡分析,认为自发合作供给的投入水平尚未突破固定费用最低门槛的情况下,一期决策的非合作均衡水平与个体间异质程度无关;而在初始投入水平突破最低费用门槛情况下,异质性程度与集体行动实现呈负相关关系。 Using the different shares in sharing resources to character individual heterogeneity, this paper builds an analytic model to analyze the relation between heterogeneity and collective action. It argues that, if the collection devotion doesn＇ t reach the lowest line of action cost, the degree of individual heterogeneity has nothing to do with the non-cooperation equilibrium; when the collection devotion breakthroughs the lowest line of action cost, the individual heterogeneity is negative correlative with the level of collective actions.

作者宋妍晏鹰

机构地区中国矿业大学管理学院江苏省高邮经济开发区管委会

出处《软科学》 CSSCI 北大核心 2011年第11期52-55,60,共5页 Soft Science

基金中国博士后科学基金项目(20100471403) 江苏省博士后科研资助项目(1001079C) 中国矿业大学社会科学基金项目(0J091182) 中国矿业大学人才引进项目

关键词共享资源自发供给异质性 sharing resource spontaneous supply heterogeneity

分类号 F294.1 [经济管理—国民经济]

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参考文献25

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