信息不对称下联合风险投资优化决策模型研究被引量：1

Research on the Optimized Decision Model for Venture Capital Syndication with Asymmetric Information

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摘要通过运用机制设计理论建立模型来对信息不对称条件下联合风险投资的优化决策问题进行研究。研究结果表明,是否采用联合风险投资主要受信息不对称程度影响,通过估量信息不对称程度可以确定最优联合数量①和投资比率。 This paper mainly studies the optimized decision problem of VC syndication under asymmetric information in use of the mechanism design theory. The results show that the adoption of VC syndication mainly depends on the degree of information asymmetry, and the optimal number of syndication and investment ratio can be got through assessing the degree of information asymmetry. It provides theoretical basis and practical guidance for investment decision of VC enterprises.

作者游达明潘荣辉

机构地区中南大学商学院

出处《软科学》 CSSCI 北大核心 2011年第11期132-135,共4页 Soft Science

基金国家自然科学基金创新群体项目(70921001/G0104) 教育部新世纪优秀人才支持计划项目(NCET-08-0578)

关键词联合风险投资信息不对称优化决策模型 venture capital syndication information asymmetry optimized decision model

分类号 F830.59 [经济管理—金融学]

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