讨价还价下供应链批发价格契约参数分析及实验研究

Ananlysis of Supply Chain Wholesale Price Contract Parameters and Experimental Research Under Bargaining

为实现供应链协调,避免双重边际化效应,提高供应链的核心竞争力,供应链契约设计尤为重要。在对批发价格契约研究进行了简要总结及分析讨价还价模型后,利用批发价格契约与讨价还价理论,进行了相关实验设计与研究。对批发价格契约中的典型参数分不讨价还价和讨价还价两种情况进行了建模,以批发价格契约为例,采用QT程序设计语言编程,以人-机对话方式模拟了供应商与零售商的交易过程,发现供应商和零售商的收益皆大于不讨价还价情况。

In order to realize the coordination of supply chain,avoid the dual boundary effects,and enhance the supply chain＇s core competitiveness,the de sign of supply chain contracts should be attached more importance to.Through summarizing the researches on wholesale price contract,this paper suggests using economical experiments to design its coordination mechanism.Based on its basic model and the game theory of bargaining,are higher the supply chain contract is experimentally studied.The typical parameters are modeled under two kinds of situations： bargaining and not bargaining.Using the QT programming language,the process is simulated by the way of people-machine dialogues,and it is found that both the supplier＇s and the retailer＇s incomes are higher when bargaining.