我国足球职业联赛中的委托——代理关系之研究

Research on the Principal-agent Relations in China Professional Football League

运用西方经济理论,分析了我国职业体育市场中的委托——代理关系及委托——代理问题的表现、基本模式和产生的原因,讨论了职业体育协会和职业体育俱乐部之间均衡合同的达成问题,构建了裁判员道德风险模型,在裁判员道德风险的边际收益等于其边际成本时,裁判员道德风险净收益达到最大化。在职业体育市场中,激励机制设计的目标是让代理人“做老实人、讲老实话、办老实事”。

Applying the knowledge of micro-cconolnics.the paper analyzes the basic modes of principal-agent relations and causes to principal-agent problems in Chinese professional football league,discusses the problems of the equilibrium contracts between professional sport association and professiohal sport clubs constructs the referee's Moral Hazard model,and points out that a referee can realize his the largest net return when MR_M is equal to MC_M.The goals of incentive system are to let the agent be an honest person and acts honestly.