摘要
Expected utility theory of Von Neumann-Morgenstern assumes that a preference order is defined for all lotteries (c1, p; c2, 1 -p) (of with probability p, c2 with probability 1 - p) for all real p, 0≤p≤1. But when the probability p is irrational, it is hard to interpret the lottery intuitively. The utility theory of J. C. Shepherdson is introduced based on rational probabilities in this paper. And then, this paper studies the axioms proposed by J. C. Shepherdson, and puts forward a set of alternative axioms. At last, it is shown that both sets of axioms are equivalent.
Expected utility theory of Von Neumann-Morgenstern assumes that a preference order is defined for all lotteries (c1, p; c2, 1 -p) (of with probability p, c2 with probability 1 - p) for all real p, 0≤p≤1. But when the probability p is irrational, it is hard to interpret the lottery intuitively. The utility theory of J. C. Shepherdson is introduced based on rational probabilities in this paper. And then, this paper studies the axioms proposed by J. C. Shepherdson, and puts forward a set of alternative axioms. At last, it is shown that both sets of axioms are equivalent.
基金
Supported by the National Natural Science Foundation of China(No.79870034).
