浅论管理人持股

Analysis on Managerial staff as Stockholders

企业高级管理人员是股份制公司治理结构中的重要组成部分 ,管理人激励问题构成了现代企业理论的核心内容之一。公司所有权与经营权的分离形成了股东与经理人之间的委托—代理契约关系。由于契约双方存在着不可避免的利益冲突 ,代理问题的产生也就在所难免。管理人持股设计了一种激励机制来解决代理问题。大量事实证明了其有效性。在目前我国进行的管理人持股探索过程中还存在着许多问题 ,导致了国企管理人持股与企业业绩之间的弱相关性。为了改变现有状况 ,必须在管理人持股内部机制的健全和外部环境的完善等方面作更多的努力。

Enterprises′ senior administrative personndl would be the most important part if the joint-stock companies were to be put in order. The problem,how to inspire the administrative personnel, becomes the focus of modern management theories. The companies ownership separating from management rights has formed an agency by agreement relationship between stockholders and managers. Because of existing inevitable interest conflict between them between them,the generation of agent problems can hardly be avoided.″Administrators as stockholders″ is a rind of inspiring system which is designed in order to solve the problems of agencg.A large quantity of facts has proved its efficiency. But in order to change current situation,more and more efforts should be taken to improce and perfevt the internal system and external environment of ″administrators as stockholders″.