税企博弈模型──防止出口骗税的一个对策

A GAME MODEL FOR DEALING WITH SWINDLING TAX REIMBURSEMENT IN THE NAME OF EXPORT

本文初步探讨了现行出口骗税行为处罚所产生的负效应，进而建立了税企博弈模型．在国家税收期望损失为零的情况下，首次提出了出口骗税罚款系数公式（L）．该公式揭示了罚款系数与检查概率之间的关系，为税务决策部门制定罚款系数及税务操作部门安排检查力量提供了理论依据．公式（L）可操作性强，具有一定的实用价值．

In this paper we make an investigation on the effect caused by the present rule of levying a fine onthose who gets,in a fraudulent way,a tax reimbursement in the name of export. We develop a game model between the taxation office and merchants committing such a crime. From this model we deduce a coefficient formula for the monetary penalty in terms of the ratio of the quantities actually inspected and those to be inspected.