基于三方期权博弈的动漫企业合并决策分析

Analysis of a Firm's Merging Decisions of Animation Industry under Trilateral Option Game

在三方期权博弈模型的结构下,分析了动漫产业竞争条件下的企业合并决策,得出市场均衡条件下企业的利润函数。进一步构建了实物期权模型,分析企业在动态环境下合并的时机和合并的可能性。结论表明,中资企业的合并决策为外资企业提供了"搭便车"的机会,并且企业的竞争优势越大,产品的差异化程度越小,则合并后外资企业会获得越大的相对收益。并且,企业的竞争优势越弱,中外产品的差异化程度越高,则合并的时机会越早。企业的外部环境较好会促使企业合并的产生。所得出的结论为我国的动漫产业在通过合并去扩大规模的过程中如何避免外资企业出现"搭便车"的行为提供了有益的参考。

This paper analyzes a firm＇s merging decisions of animation industry under trilateral option game,and obtains the firms＇ profit functions in the market equilibrium.Moreover,the real options model is built,and the timing and probability are discussed in the dynamics framework.The conclusions show that Chinese firms＇ merger gives foreign firms＂free-riding＂ and that the stronger competitive force and the diversified producers Chinese firms have,the more relative benefits foreign firms gain.On the other hand,the weaker competitive force and less diversified products Chinese firms have,the earlier the merger tends to take place.Moreover,the favorable external environment of firms can accelerate the merger of Chinese firms.These research results provide useful references to the Chinese firms that seek expansion through merger without foreign firms＇ ＂free-riding＂.