基于信号理论的中国IPO市场审计师选择实证研究被引量：4

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摘要本文采用实证的研究方法,以信号传递理论为基础,以2003年至2005年沪深两市A股IPO公司为研究对象,采用Logistic回归模型检验IPO市场审计师选择行为的影响因素,用DFH的IPO价值评估信号模型检验审计师选择行为与IPO价值的关系。研究发现:留存所有权比例较高的IPO公司不倾向于聘请高质量审计师,高声誉承销商倾向于IPO客户选择高质量审计师,由"四大"审计的IPO价值较高。

作者胡静

机构地区无锡高等师范学校

出处《财会通讯（下）》 2011年第4期131-133,160,共4页 Communication of Finance and Accounting

关键词审计师选择信号传递 IPO价值

分类号 F239.4 [经济管理—会计学] F832.51 [经济管理—金融学] F224 [经济管理—国民经济]

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