非对称信息下第三方物流企业道德风险模型分析

本文基于信息经济学中的委托-代理理论,构建了第三方物流企业道德风险模型,定量分析了如何通过设立约束机制使货主利益得到有效保障,得出了有利于提高物流服务质量、水平的分析结论,最后提出了应在完善激励与监督机制、提高市场信息的透明度等方面,约束第三方物流企业败德行为的建议。

The paper has buih a moral risk model for third party logistics providers by applying principal - agent theory in the information economics, quantitatively analyzed how to set up commitment mechanism to effectively safeguard shipper interests, and made the conclusions that is beneficial to the enhancement of the logistics service quality and level. At last, this paper proposes some advice on restraining the moral hazard of third party logistics companies from the aspects of improving incentive and monitoring mechanism, and increasing the transparency of market information.