农业企业与金融机构借贷行为博弈分析

本文分析了农业企业申请借款的约束条件和金融机构发放贷款的必要条件,建立了双方借贷行为的动态博弈模型。通过对双方博弈过程的分析,在金融机构判断农业企业属于高收益能力时,可实现精炼贝叶斯均衡"农业企业申请借款-金融机构发放贷款",达到双赢目标。然而,在现实中要实现双赢目标的精炼贝叶斯均衡并非易事。为确保双赢目标的精炼贝叶斯均衡的实现,农业企业在申请借款前应做好项目投资可行性分析,进行正确决策,按借款规定使用资金,加强诚信建设;金融机构应加强贷款发放前的调研工作,主动参与贷款使用过程的监管。同时,双方应加强信息披露工作。

This paper has analyzed the constraint conditions of agricultural enterprises＇ loan application and the essential conditions of banking institutes＇ loan issuing, and built the dynamic game model of lending behaviors on both sides. Through the analysis on the process of game on both sides, the paper believes that when banking institutes judge that agricultural enterprises have high revenue capability, it is possible to realize perfect Bayesian equilibrium ＂agricultural enterprises to apply for loan, and banking institute to issue loans＂ so as to reach the win -win goal. However, in reality, it is not easy to reach the win -win goal of perfect Bayesian equilibrium. In order to ensure realizing the goal of win - win of perfect Bayesian equilibrium, the agricultural enterprises should prepare feasibility analysis and make correct decisions, use capital according to loan regulations, and enhance the sincerity construction; prior to loan issuing banking institutes should strengthen the research works, and actively participate the supervision over loan use. Meanwhile, both sides should reinforce the information disclosure.