市场化程度、审计师选择与借款融资——来自中国民营上市公司的经验证据

Degree of Marketization,Auditor Selection and Loan Financing:Evidence from the Chinese Private-owned Listed Companies

以2004～2009年民营A股上市公司为样本,具体考察了审计师选择对公司借款融资的影响。研究表明,民营上市公司选择"四大"为外部审计师,会显著有助于公司后续的借款融资;进一步研究发现,在市场化程度较低的地区,民营上市公司选择"四大"为外部审计师对获取借款融资的影响有所加强。分析认为,基于信号传递理论,银行为了降低对市场化程度较低地区企业的贷款风险,由高质量事务所代表的高质量审计必然成为公司外部治理环境不完善的一种有效替代机制,以降低银行和公司间的信息不对称,实现上市公司借款融资的目的。

This paper examines the impacts of auditor selection on loan financing using the data from A share private owned listed companies in China from 2004 to 2009. The empirical results indicate that ＂Big Four＂ that are choosed by private-owned companies as external auditors can significantly contribute to subsequent loan financing. Further study shows that impact of ＂Big Four＂ on corporate＇s subsequent loan financing seems more significant in some areas where degree of marketization is lower. Signaling theory tell us that high quality audit report has been used as a tool to reduce the information asymmetry between banks and firms.