期刊文献+

“发行方付费”模式下的信用评级法律迷局解析 被引量:13

The Interpretation of the Legal Puzzle Concerning Credit Rating under the Model of Paid-by-the-Issuers
原文传递
导出
摘要 信用评级机构在次贷产品评级中,丧失独立公正,其根本原因在于其"发行方付费"的收费模式。在"发行方付费"模式下,信用评级机构丧失了"投资者付费"模式下的声誉资本约束。危机后的改革并没有触动"发行方付费"模式。审视资本市场中的信用评级机构,发现其具有中介机构和准监管机构的性质,信用评级报告不再是一种媒体观点而是一种专家意见。因此,信用评级机构与发行方之间应是承揽合同关系,信用评级机构对投资者负有信赖义务,承担专家责任。 The credit rating-agencies have lost independence and justice in the sub-credit products,the fundamental reason for which is the'paid-by-the-issuers' model,under which credit rating-agencies have lost the restrain of reputational capital that exists in the model of being paid by the investors.The reforms after the financial crisis have not broken the original model of being paid by the issuers.After observing the credit rating-agencies in capital market and exploiting their natures of intermediary institution and quasi-supervisory institution,it's certain that the report of credit rating is not the opinion of press,but the perspectives of specialists.Thus the relationship between the rating-agencies and the issuers is a contract of work.The rating-agencies are obligated to be relied upon by the investors and they are to exercise professional responsibility.
作者 刘迎霜
出处 《法律科学(西北政法大学学报)》 CSSCI 北大核心 2011年第6期137-144,共8页 Science of Law:Journal of Northwest University of Political Science and Law
基金 中国博士后科学基金第三批特别资助项目(201003231):"公司债信托法律问题研究" 国家社会科学基金重大项目(09&ZD030):"深化金融体制改革"
关键词 信用评级机构 发行方付费 准监管机构 信赖义务 专家意见 credit rating agencies paid-by-the-issuers quasi-supervisory institution fiduciary duty professional opinion
  • 相关文献

参考文献17

  • 1Securities and Exchange Commission, Summary report of issues identified in the commission staff's examinations of select credit rating agencies, 2008.
  • 2John Patrick Hunt, Credit Rating Agencies and the "Worldwide Credit Crisis" : the Limits of Reputation, the Insufficiency of Reform, and a Proposal for Improvement, 2009 COLUM. BUS. L. REV. , 109.
  • 3严婷.信用评级机构“罪与罚”的背后[J],第一财经日报,2010-05-18(A10).
  • 4Franklin Strier, Rating the Raters : Conflicts of Interest in the Credit Rating Firms, Business and Society Review 113:4, pp. 533 - 553.
  • 5European Commission, Approval of New Regulation Will Raise Standards for the Issuance of Credit Ratings Used in the Commu- nity. Working Paper No. 1795, Brussels, 23 April 2009.
  • 6王磊燕.美证监会剑指信用评级制度改革势在必行[N].第一财经日报,2009-04-17.
  • 7张强,张宝.金融危机背景下我国信用评级机构声誉机制研究[J].经济经纬,2010,27(1):150-154. 被引量:17
  • 8Frank Partnoy, The Paradox of Credit Ratings, U San Diego Law & Econ Research Paper, No. 20( October 2001 ), p. 3.
  • 9Theresa Nagy, Credit Rating Agencies and the First Amendment: Applying Constitutional Journalistic Protections to Subprime Mortgage Litigation, 94 Minn. L. Rev. 140. , November, 2009.
  • 10In re Jefferson County School District No. R - 1 v. Moody' s Investor's Service,988F. Supp. 1341 (D. Colo. 1977), and 175F. 3d. 848 ( 10th Cir. 1999 ).

二级参考文献16

  • 1吴风云,赵静梅.论美国证券信用评级霸权[J].世界经济,2005,28(12):44-51. 被引量:12
  • 2BECKER B, TODD M. 2008. Reputation and Competition: Evidence from the Credit Rating Industry[ Z]. HBS Finance working paper.
  • 3BOOTH J, et al. 1986. Capital Raising, under Writing and the Certification Hypothesis [ J ]. Journal of Financial Economic, ( 15 ) : 261 -281.
  • 4CHEMMANUR T, FULGHIERI P. 1994. Investment bank reputation, information production and financial intermediation [ J ]. Journal of Finance, (49) :57 - 79.
  • 5FABIAN D. 2007. The Credit Rating Industry: Competition and Regulation[ J ]. University of Cologne Department of Economics, (1) :12 -16.
  • 6KLEIN B, LEFFER K. 1981. The Role of Market Forces in Assuring Contractual Performance [ J ]. Journal of Political Economy, (4) : 615 - 641.
  • 7KREP D, MILGROM P, WILSON R. 1982. Rational Cooperation in the Finitely Repeated Prisoners Dilemma[J]. Journal of Economic Theory, (27) : 245 - 252.
  • 8KREP D, WILSON R. 1982. Reputation and Imperfect Information [ J ]. Journal of Economic Theory, ( 27 ) :253 - 279.
  • 9MARIANO B. 2008. Do Reputational Concerns Lead to Reliable Ratings[ EB/OL] http ://ssrn. corn/abstract = 1106653.
  • 10MILGROM P, ROBERTS J. 1982. Price and Advertising Signals of Product Quality [ J ]. Journal of Economic Theory, ( 2 ) : 280 - 312.

共引文献18

同被引文献114

二级引证文献32

相关作者

内容加载中请稍等...

相关机构

内容加载中请稍等...

相关主题

内容加载中请稍等...

浏览历史

内容加载中请稍等...
;
使用帮助 返回顶部