旅游景区环境保护博弈分析

The Game Analysis of Environmental Protection at Scenic Spots

通过建立旅游景区环境保护博弈模型,对一次性博弈和无限次重复博弈的均衡进行分析,揭示旅游景区环境破坏的动因,并提出确保博弈停留在均衡状态的对策。研究发现:游客和经营商在一次性博弈中,不治理环境是经营商的占优策略,结果导致旅游景区环境的破坏。在游客和经营商的无限次重复博弈中,帕累托最优均衡(游客选择旅游,经营商选择治理环境)的实现,依赖于参与方(游客或经营商)对触发策略(旅游或治理环境)的选择。政府对经营商的监管可以强行促使其治理环境,从而改进博弈均衡的效率,实现旅游景区的环境保护和旅游业的可持续发展。

Game model of environmental protection at scenic spots is established in this paper in order to carry out analysis of the balance between one-time game and infinitely repeated game,disclose the reasons why the environment of scenic spots are destroyed,and propose the countermeasures to ensure the equilibrium of the game.The study also reveals that during the one-time game between tourists and tour operators,it is tour operators＇ dominant strategy not to control environmental pollution that leads to the destruction of environment at scenic spots.While,during the infinitely repeated game between tourists and tour operators,the realization of Pareto optimality equilibrium（The strategy of tourist is traveling,and the strategy of tour operators are controlling environmental pollution） is dependent upon the choice of players（tourists or operators） of triggering strategy（traveling or controlling environmental pollution）.The supervision of the government upon operators can force them to control environmental pollution,which can consequently improve the efficiency of equilibrium in the game,and promote environmental protection at tourism scenic spots and sustainable development of tourism.