保险市场逆向选择的信号传递博弈研究

Analysis of Adverse Selection under the Framework of Signaling Model

在保险市场中,投保人比保险人更了解自己的风险状况,保险双方之间的这种信息不对称难以避免地会产生逆向选择问题,于是在保险人混同定价的情形下,低风险投保人要承受过高的费率而受损,高风险投保人因保险成本过低而削弱控制风险的激励,导致整个市场资源配置低效甚至因逆向选择螺旋而崩溃。通过引入信号传递机制来实现保险市场的分离定价,从而规避逆向选择及其负面影响;同时通过信号传递博弈模型得出稳定分离均衡的条件,并基于此提出相应的对策建议。

In the insurance market, the policyholder knows his own risk conditions better than the insurer. Such information asymmetry unavoidably results in an adverse selection： under a mixed pricing strategy, the low-risk policyholder bears the loss due to a relatively high cost while the high-risk policyholder loses the incentive to control his risk due to a relatively low cost, leading to an inefficient allocation of resources and even an adverse selection spiral followed by a market crash. This paper deh with the problem of adverse selection and provided a method of separate pricing by introducing a signaling mechanism. By analyzing the signaling model,the author offered a stable equilibrium solution under the special condition and the corresponding suggestions.