知觉经验是否有表征内容

Does Perceptual Experience Have Content

心灵哲学与认识论中的一个重要问题是知觉经验是否有内容。多数当代哲学家认为知觉经验是表征,因而是有内容的,称之为内容观。特拉维斯和布鲁尔等人则认为,内容观与朴素实在论是不相容的,朴素实在论支持的是关系观,即知觉经验是认知者与心灵独立的事物或性质之间的关系。通过对特拉维斯和布鲁尔论证过程的分析,可以发现,内容观与关系观并不冲突,并且,一个认识论上适切的内容观应该吸收部分关系观的见解。一个更为强健的观点是:知觉经验具有某种呈现模式下的罗素式命题内容。

Whether perceptual experience has content or not is an important issue in the research on mentalist philosophy and epistemology. Most contemporary philosophers assert that perceptual experience is a form of representation and therefore has content. This view is called ＂the Content View＂ and has been challenged by philosophers such as Charles Travis and Bill Brewer who argue that the Content View is not compatible with Na？ ve Realism which favors the ＂Relational View＂ that perceptual experience is the relation between subjects and mind-independent objects and properties. This paper analyzes the rationale of the Content View proposed hy Travis and Brewer and concludes that the Content View and the Relational View are not contradictory. It is suggested that the Content View should incorporate some views of the Relational View if the former aims to be supported in epistemological terms. This paper also argues that perceptual experience has some Russellian propositional content in the mode of presentation.