转移性约束对风险投资家筹集基金行为的影响

Effect of Transfer Restriction on Venture Capitalist Raising Fund

针对信息非对称条件下风险投资家筹集基金时投资者可能出现的逆向选择问题,采用不完全信息静态博弈理论方法,构造了以转移性约束为选择变量、目标函数为风险投资家从两个风险投资基金中取得最大化收益的博弈模型。该模型合理解释了实施转移性约束可有效区分基金投资者的类型,资本市场的信息非对称程度越严重,风险投资家对投资者实施的转移性约束越有效。

By the static game theory and method in the condition of incomplete information,this paper constructs the game model in which transfer restriction is the choice variable to maximize venture capitalists＇ profits from two venture capital funds,and analyzes investors＇ the adverse selection problems when venture capitalists raise funds in asymmetric information.Based on this model,different types of fund investors could be distinguished through transfer restriction,and more severe the degree of information asymmetry in capital market is,more effective the transfer restriction of venture capitalists to investors is.