信息不对称下基于Stackelberg模型的互补型航空公司战略选择研究

Study on Strategic Choice of Complementary Airline Based on Stackelberg Model under Information Asymmetry

本文假设在信息不对称下由领导者和跟随者的两个航空公司提供互补型航空产品的垄断市场里,每个航空公司掌握关于不确定性市场需求的私人预测信息,以此来决定是否与其他航空公司共享其预测信息。研究发现,完全信息共享没有完美均衡,只有领导者航空公司高估跟随者航空公司的需求预测值才会出现"双赢",否则信息共享对领导者有利,对跟随者不利;为避免出现"信息共享渗漏效应",我们提出"信息共享计划"。研究结论将有助于互补型航空公司决策如何与其他航空共享其预测信息以及何种条件下信息共享价值较高。

We consider a duopoly market where two separate airlines offer complementary air products in a leader-follower type move under information asymmetry.Each airline has private forecast information about the uncertain market demand and decides whether to share it with the other airline.We show that information sharing would not result to perfect equilibrium under independent pricing.Only if the leader airline ＇s estimation of the follower airline ＇s forecast is higher compared to its true value,there would lead to a＂win-win＂situation for both airlines,otherwise,information sharing would benefit the leader airline but hurt the follower airline;We devise a＂information sharing scheme＂to avoid＂information sharing leakage effect＂.Our conclusion would help the airlines understand how they should share their individual forecasts with others and under which circumstances the value of information sharing is high.