基于委托代理的创业投资引导基金管理模式研究

A Study on the Management Mode of Venture Capital Guidance Fund with Principle Agency Theory

政府创业投资引导基金在运作中存在着三重委托代理关系,政府与引导基金管理机构之间委托代理问题的解决是成功实现政策引导目标的首要环节。在不对称信息下,引导基金管理机构的努力与付出受其专业水平、收益函数及投资政策的影响。因此,自设事业单位或国有企业管理,难以实现对引导基金管理机构的有效激励与约束。而在委托管理模式下,可以通过合约设计,吸引专业素质高的管理机构,激励管理机构努力工作,并降低管理成本。

In the operation of government venture capital guidance fund,there exist triple principal agent problems.Solving the principal agent problem between the government and the guidance fund＇s management organ is the first key link to implement policy guiding goal successfully.Under asymmetric information,efforts the guidance fund＇s management organ would make depend on its professional level,the profit function and investment policy.Therefore,it is difficult to form an effective incentive and restraint mechanism while the guidance fund is managed by the public institution or the state-owned enterprise.And under the entrusted management mode,government venture capital guidance fund can attract excellent management team and inspire them working hard with an efficient contract arrangement to reduce the management cost.