金融创新、投资者逃离与央行危机救助

Financial Innovation,Investor Escape and Central Bank Bail Out

从1970年的商业票据危机到2008年的全球金融危机,历史上发生过多次因金融创新的复杂性诱发投资者逃离进而演化为金融危机的事件,而危机的最终化解多借助于央行的危机救助。本文基于投资者逃离模型,从金融创新及其产生的投资者不确定性出发讨论金融危机中投资者逃离行为,并通过对投资者逃离行为的分析探讨央行危机救助的时点与方式。本文认为,就金融危机的事前预防而言,央行应在创新工具运用的过程中引导金融机构开展充分的投资者教育及对创新工具的总规模进行适当限制从而降低危机发生的概率和破坏性;就金融危机的事后救助而言,央行危机救助的时点应放在投资者对未来的不确定性突然增加并开始调整原有策略的时刻,救助的主要措施是承诺在一定条件下购买资产或注入流动性,从而降低投资者不确定性,促使投资者改变逃离市场的策略或者至少避免投资者逃离成为群体行为。

From the commercial paper crisis in 1970 to the subprime crisis in 2008, there have been many such events due to the complexity of financial innovation, inducing investors＇ escape to liquidity, and ultimately resolved by means of the central bank bail out. This article is based on the model of the investors＇ escape to liquidity, and the resulting uncertainty for investors to dis- cuss the financial crisis.We show that the central bank should guide the financial institutions to carry out adequate investor educa- tion of the innovative instruments and limiting the overall size to reduce the probability of a destructive crisis. For to salvation af- ter the financial crisis, the central bank should begin to aid investors when a sudden increase in uncertainty emerges. The main mea- sures is to relief under certain conditions, to purchase assets or inject liquidity, reducing investor uncertainty, investors to change the escaping strategy ,at least avoiding investors＇ escape falling into group behavior.