摘要
大多数哲学家认为,道德探讨必须首先从善的定义出发。而康德却另辟蹊径地指出,善作为意志与行为的关联,如果它的确立是先于道德法则的,并且它决定我们的欲求能力,那么它只能是一个经验的、偶然的概念,根本无法承担起道德评价所需要的确定性,也不可能支撑起需要确定规范性的道德哲学体系。相反,道德法则因为具有先天确定形式而成为普遍的评价标准,因而能够支撑起有规范意义的道德理论。所以,道德探讨的起点首先是寻求普遍的道德法则并进而通过道德法则确定作为意志对象的善。然而,对于道德生活而言,基于确定性的道德原则和基于欲求能力的幸福同是我们生活意义之所在,只考虑其中之一是有失偏颇的。
Most philosophers consider that discussion of morality should begin with the definition of good and can go on discussing more. Kant, taking a very different way, points that the concept of good is the relation of the will to the action. The concept of good, determined prior to the moral law and deciding our faculty of desire, is an empirically, contingently concept, can' t support the determinacy which moral evaluation needs and the normativity which the system of moral philosophy needs. Reversely, the moral law can become the universal standard of evaluation and support the moral theory which has normative meaning because of its a prior form. Therefore, the discussion of morality should begin with universal moral law which determines the good as the object of the will. To our moral life, however, both the moral law which is based on determinacy and the happiness which is based on the faculty of desire are our goals. Separate considering any aspect is biased.
出处
《社会科学》
CSSCI
北大核心
2011年第12期127-134,共8页
Journal of Social Sciences