零售寡头横向竞争对渠道纵向关系的影响

The Effects of Horizontal Competition between Oligopoly Retailers on Vertical Relationship in a Distribution Channel

本文在一个拓展的豪特林模型基础上,结合家电行业案例,研究了零售寡头之间的横向竞争如何影响渠道纵向关系。结论表明:在由寡头零售商与垄断竞争供货商形成的渠道结构中,零售商纵向压价的动机可以在竞争对手的销售相对较小、且供货商不愿放弃销售机会的情况下变为现实;零售商都将不断扩张网点来抑制对手的低价购入与压价行为,并争夺供货商货源;随着零售商销售能力的提升,其对于供货商的谈判能力将不断增强,进而压低上游供货商的价格,影响渠道纵向关系。

Based on a Hotelling model and home appliance case study, this paper analyzes how horizontal competition between oligopoly retailers affects vertical relationship in a distribution channel. The conclusion shows that, facing monopolistic suppliers, a retailer can realize its incentive of upstream price-undercutting when the counterpart has smaller selling capacity and the suppliers are not willing to lose sales. Thus the weaker retailer shall using store expansion to compete for suppliers and hamper its competitor in getting lower price. As its selling capacity grows, the retailer gains bargain power in price negotiations with suppliers, which affects the vertical relationship in distribution channel.