摘要
运用激励理论分析政府与公交企业之间的委托代理关系,从激励公交企业提高服务水平的角度出发,构建了信息不对称条件下政府与城市公交企业的委托代理模型,证明了政府合适的补贴机制可以激励城市公交企业优化服务水平,为政府对企业进行补贴激励决策提供了理论依据。
Based on the theory of incentives,we analyze the principal-agent relation between the government and the urban public transportation enterprise,and the model was constructed under the information asymmetrical from the government drive the public transportation service level enhances.Proved that ppropriate subsidy mechanism may encourage the urban public transportation enterprise to optimize service level,the theory basis is provided for the decision-making which the government provide incentive subsidy to the urban public transportation enterprise.
出处
《三门峡职业技术学院学报》
2011年第2期118-120,共3页
Journal of Sanmenxia Polytechnic
关键词
委托代理
服务水平
激励机制
Principal-agent
Service level
Incentive mechanism