摘要
本文研究了一个不确定环境下二级供应链机制设计问题。供应商的类型被刻画为一个模糊变量。应用委托代理理论建立其期望效用最大化问题的模型。利用庞特立亚金极大值原理给出了模型最优解的必要条件。
This paper studies an optimal mechanism design in a two level supply chain under an uncertainty environment.The type of the supplier is denoted as a fuzzy variable.Applying the principal-agent theory,a model is set up to maximize the utility of the manufacturer.Pontryagin maximum principle is adopted in this paper to obtain the necessary condition of the optimal solutions.
出处
《价值工程》
2011年第36期13-13,共1页
Value Engineering
关键词
委托代理
不对称信息
机制设计
供应链
principal-agent
asymmetric information
mechanism design
supply chain
