信息结构、金融监管与金融机构行为——基于委托代理的博弈分析

Information Structure,Financial Supervision and the Behavior of Financial Organizations——Game Analysis Based on Principal Agent

金融机构的代理投资行为受到监管部门的监管。金融监管者旨在增加社会福利,而信息的非对称性限制了这一目标的实现。通过建立监管条件下金融消费者、金融机构和监管者之间的多方博弈模型,分析信息结构对代理冲突、监管行为以及社会福利的影响。结果表明,违规所带来的高风险溢价诱使金融机构违反监管政策,且非对称信息降低了监管者的监管努力程度,诱使金融机构从事违规活动,降低总的社会福利。

The delegated investment behaviors of financial organizations are supervised by supervision departments. Financial supervisors aim to increase social welfare, but the purpose is restricted by information asymmetry. By establishing a multi-player game model among financial consumers, financial organizations and supervisors under supervision, the authors analyze the influence of information structure on agency conflict, supervision behavior and social welfare. The results show that the high risk premium by violating regulations induces financial organizations to violate supervision policies. Besides, information asymmetry decreases the endeavor of supervisors, which induces financial organizations to make mistakes, and the social welfare as a whole is decreased.