“一号命令”辨析

Analysis of "No. 1 Command"

"一号命令"是1969年10月中旬林彪通过军委办事组发布全军的一个战备命令。这个命令是在珍宝岛事件后苏联出现一系列针对中国的军事异动,中共中央判断苏联极有可能对中国发动突然袭击的关节点发出的。林彪在发出命令之前向毛泽东作了汇报,但命令在传输过程中出现冠名等问题,致使这个命令在中央核心层引起一系列复杂反应。"九一三"事件后,这个命令又被称为林彪"篡党夺权的预演",被长期追查,使之更加复杂化,至今存在许多误解。围绕"一号命令"出现的问题反映出军队存在的一些综合性问题。它与"文化大革命"中的政治形势,以及军队领导体制的不正常、军队正规化建设制度被否定有直接的关系,折射出"文化大革命"以来军队建设中潜伏的危机。

'No. 1 Command' was a combat readiness command to the whole army released by Lin Biao by means of administrative group of the Central Military Commission in mid-October 1969. The joint point of this command's release was Soviet military transactions against China after Treasure Island Incident and the CPC Central Committee judged that Soviet Union was likely to attack China suddenly. Before the release, Lin Biao had reported the command to Mao Zedong. But because of the naming during the process of command's transmission, the command raised a series of complex reactions among the central core leaders. After the '9·13 Incident ', the command was also known as Lin Biao's 'preview of usurping the leadership and taking over power' and got a long-time investigation, which made it more complicated and existed many misunderstandings until now. The problems around the 'No1 Command' reflected many comprehensive issues of the Army. All of those had direct relationships with the ultra-leftist political situation in the Cultural Revolution, the abnormality of the military leadership structure and the denial of army regularized construction system, which reflected the potential crisis of military construction since Cultural Revolution.