谈判视角下风险投资股权配置及其成因——基于浙江数据的实证研究

Venture capital equity allocation and its causes:an empirical study from negotiation perspective using data of Zhejiang Province

股权配置是风险投资中的关键性问题,然而现有研究更多强调最优股权安排和制度设计,忽略对现实配置状态及其成因的关注。本研究从谈判视角构建了风险投资股权配置及其谈判力来源的理论框架,并结合浙江省数据进行实证分析,发现资金因素和人力资源因素在股权配置中有着不同作用机制。在资金方面,风险投资机构资金投入与风险投资机构股权比例存在正相关,但随创业企业发展相关性逐步趋弱。创业企业资金并非显著谈判力来源;在人力资源方面,创业者创业经历与风险投资机构股权比例存在负相关,随着创业企业发展相关性同样逐步趋弱。风险投资机构从业经验与其股权比例存在显著负相关。

Equity allocation is a key issue in venture capital,however,current research focuses on optimal arrangement and institution design,ignories the reality and its causes.A theoretical framework is built to analyze the sources of bargaining power and equity allocation from the perspective of negotiation.Combined with an empirical analysis of sample data from Zhejiang Province,several results are achieved.Financial and human resources have different effects on equity allocation.The venture capital firms＇ investment amount is positive correlated with their equity proportion,and the correlation will become weaker with the development of start-ups.The entrepreneur＇s investment amount is not a source of significant bargaining power.The entrepreneur＇s business experience is negative correlatied with venture capital firm＇s equity proportion,and the correlation will also become weaker with the development of start-ups.Venture capital firms＇ experience is significantly negative correlatied with their equity proportion.