基于目标企业管理层响应策略的并购决策

Merger and Acquisition Decision Based on the Response Strategies of the Target's Management

建立期权博弈模型,分析主并企业在考虑目标企业管理层响应策略时的并购决策确定问题。通过引入管理层反应行为,分别研究增加并购成本和直接阻止并购两种反并购措施下的博弈均衡结果,重点探讨了不同反并购效率下主并企业的并购策略选择和并购时机确定问题。研究结果表明,反并购效率不仅影响并购时机,而且影响并购策略。此外,随着反并购效率的提高,总是存在一段区域,使得主并企业的最优选择是向管理层支付价值补偿。

This paper establishes an option game model to analyze the merger and acquisition（MA） strategies when considering the response strategies of the target＇s management.Through the introduction of the reaction behavior of target＇s management,we obtained respectively the equilibrium results under two types of MA defense mechanisms（increasing the MA cost and directly prevent MA）,and discussed the MA strategy and timing under different efficiencies of MA defense.There are some meaningful results.Firstly,the efficiency of MA defense affects not only the MA timing,but also the MA strategies.Secondly,with the efficiency of MA defense increase,there is a region,enables which acquirers to compensate for management.