电信业非价格歧视激励与政府接入规制探析

On the Non-price Discrimination Incentive of Telecommunication Industry and Governmental Access Regulation

本文通过一个Stackelberg模型分析得出,在纵向一体化的自由化结构下,不管主导企业的下游附属企业相对于新进入企业处于成本优势还是劣势,其都具有很强的动机通过实施非价格歧视手段提高新进入企业的运营成本,达到排斥下游市场竞争的目的。因此,规制机构在制定接入规制政策时,应选择合理的接入规制方法以促进下游市场的竞争。在对电信网络接入进行直接规制的同时,还可运用反垄断法进行间接规制。

In this paper,I make an analysis on a Stackelberg model,and find out that under the vertically integrated liberalization structure,no matter whether the low-lying subordinated enterprise has cost advantage or disadvantage,it still has a strong motivation to improve the operation cost of an enterprise by means of implementing non-price discrimination,in order to get rid of the competition with low-lying market.Therefore,the regulation institution should choose a reasonable access regulation method to promote the competition of low-lying market when lay down the policy of access regulation.It can not only make direct regulation of telecommunication network access,but also can implement indirect regulation by means of anti-monopoly law.