整体结构实在论与科学合理性辩护

Holistic Structural Realism and the Defense of the Rationality of Science

在科学实在论与反实在论之间及科学实在论不同流派之间的长期学术争论中,20世纪80年代末兴起的结构实在论在理论上取得了极大进展,对科学实在论诸论题提出了有力论证,然而在其理论框架中仍存在不少有待解决的问题,仍须作进一步改进。为此,应从卡尔纳普—蒯因本体论观点出发,将其构建为一种更加全面合理的整体结构实在论,即实体与关系非截然二分的、彼此相互规定的结构实在论。这种整体结构作为关于类与关系的约束变量的值,可理解为通过理论结构或拉姆西语句的整体意义所指称的对象,其实在性由该语句的存在量词所断言。正是整体结构在理论变化中保持着某种不变性、持续性,这正是科学进步合理性、理论真理性的基本前提。根据这一实在论观点,科学合理性论题便可得到更有说服力的辩护。

Structural realism, since its rise in the late 1980s, has played an important role in the debates between scientific realism and antirealism, and between different strands within scientific realism. Although structural realism has made great progress in arguing for several theses of scientific realism, it leaves many unresolved problems and its framework needs further refinement. From a Carnap-Quine ontological point of view, this paper tries to reconstruct structural realism as a more reasonable holistic form which rejects the sharp dichotomy between substances and relations and makes them mutually definable. This holistic structure, as the value of bound variables ranging over classes and relations, can be understood as the objects referred to by the theoretical structure in question or by the Ramsey sentence in question as a whole. The reality of such a structure is vindicated by the existential quantifiers of the sentence. The holistic structure preserves a sort of invariance and endurance. This is exactly the building block of the rationality of scientific progresses and approximating truth. From this realist point of view, major theses in favor of the rationality of science can be more convincingly defended.