总分公司体制下保险公司合谋问题的激励研究

Research on Incentive Mechanism for Collusion in Insurance Companies under Headquarter and Branches System

大型中资保险公司由于其庞大的总分公司结构,在总公司、内审部门与分公司间所形成的三层委托代理关系下常出现合谋现象。本文在利用多重委托代理模型的基础上,分析了合谋问题在大型保险公司的具体表现,以及不同状态下的激励水平。最终得出结论,大型保险公司中合谋问题存在并且严重,而最优激励水平应该是平衡报酬和惩罚。

Collusion phenomena between Headquarter and Branches in insurance companies are very common in present management system, so that the research on the incentive mechanism for collusion become more important. Based on the theory of multiagency, the research shows that collusion is severe and pervasive in insurance companies, and optimal incentive schemes must balance rewards and punishments.