随机产出下两级供应链供需双方的博弈

Game Analysis of a Two-Echelon Supply Chain with Random Yield

研究和分析了随机产出下两级供应链供需双方的三种博弈模型:销售商主导的Stackelberg博弈模型、生产商主导的Stackelberg博弈模型和纳什博弈模型,得到了在这3种博弈模型下的最优订购量和最优计划生产量,通过研究发现:当销售商在供应链决策中占主导地位时的最优订购量和最优计划生产量都大于其他2种情况下的对应值。最后,通过数值计算比较了在随机产出服从均匀分布时,这3种博弈下供需双方的最优策略及相应利润,并得出了选择销售商占主导地位的Stackelberg博弈行为将有利于商家获取更多利润的重要结论。

We study three game models of a two-echelon supply chain with random yield： retailer-leader Stackelberg game model,manufacturer-leader Stackelberg game model and Nash game model,and derive the optimal order quantity and optimal planned production quantity for these models,The findings indicate that when the retailer dominates the supply chain,the optimal order quantity and optimal planned production quantity is greater than those in other models.A numerical example is given to compare the optimal policies and relevant profits between both parties based on those game models when random yield obeys uniform distribution.An important conclusion is that retailerleader Stackelberg game model is better for supply chain to make more profit.