公共服务“逆向合同承包”的制度选择逻辑——以广州市环卫服务改革为例

The Institution Choice Logic of Reversion of Contracting Out in Public Service Delivery:The Case of Garbage Collection Service in Guangzhou,China

在中国一些城市的公共服务,特别是环卫服务市场化改革过程中,出现了非常值得学术界与实践部门关注的"逆向合同承包"的现象。导致基层政府做出"逆向合同承包"选择的原因,可以通过交易费用理论和中国基层政府的激励结构来加以解释。交易费用会提高合同外包的风险,这些风险部分来自政治—行政的双重体制,部分来自于市场体制。交易费用影响基层政府官员政策选择的途径既体现在经济维度上,又体现在政治维度上。尽管市场化可能会降低生产成本,节约组织费用,但是由此而来的交易费用却会降低基层政府官员对于上级政府重点关注又可以直接考察的政策项目的回应能力,使基层政府官员在升迁竞争的"政治锦标赛"中处于不利的地位。因此,当基层政府官员感觉到市场化限制了他们对此类政策项目进行回应的能力时,中国基层政府现有的问责、晋升和监控机制就会使他们有很强烈的动机去选择"逆市场化"的政策方案,导致公共服务的"逆向合同承包"。

The reversion of contracting out or de-privatization has been a staggering new phenomenon in public service delivery reform in China and other countries.Such decision-making can be explained by the theory of transaction costs and the Chinese governments' unique promotion and incentive mechanism.In contrast with the hierarchical system,the market system may be able to reduce the organization cost and decrease the production cost but it would possibly increase the transaction cost,which is partially due to the political-administrative dichotomy in China.If street-level officials could not effectively decrease the transaction cost of contracting-out,they are likely to stop marketization and go back to government-run public services.Moreover,when marketization confines street-level officials' ability to effectively respond to political requirements from the supervising government and thus reduces their chance of promotion,they will choose to reverse contracting out in order to win in the political competition.