国际环境公约有效性研究:引入监督机构的方法

The efficiency study of international environmental agreements:An approach of introducing the monitoring party

在静态博弈的框架之下,引入了一个由签约国自愿资助的第三方监督机构,使用收益方程与损失方程都为二次函数的博弈模型,研究国际环境公约的稳定规模.结果表明:不管是同时博弈模型还是序贯博弈模型,在适当的条件下,监督机制的引入都支持较大规模甚至是全合作的国际环境公约.

In the framework of static games, it introduces all independent third party with the power of monitoring, which is financed by signatories vohmtarily. It employs quadratic benefit function and damage function to study the size of stable IEAs （international environmental agreements）. The result shows that a large size or even full cooperative IEA could be supported in both simultaneous game and sequential game under appropriate conditions.