不完全信息下买卖双方供应链博弈模型研究

Study on the Buyer-seller Supply Chain Game Model under the Incomplete Information

针对买卖双方供应链中不完全信息问题,建立了卖方Stackelberg模型和买方Stackelberg模型。得出在完全信息模型中买方的最优单位营销支出和销售价格分别是卖方批量的减函数,批发价格的增函数;卖方的最优批量是买方销售价格的减函数,单位营销支出的增函数。在不完全信息下,给定需求函数中参数的联合概率分布,以及卖方成本参数的联合概率分布,买卖双方根据各自预期利润的最大化进行决策,获得各自决策变量的表达式,其形式类似于完全信息下的结果。

this paper studies the incomplete information problems of the buyer - seller supply chain, and builds the seller - stackelberg model and the buyer - stackelberg model. It concludes that the optimal unit marketing expenditures and the selling price are respectively the decreasing function of the seller lot size and the increasing function of the seller wholesale price, and the optimal seller lot size is the decreasing function of the buyer selling price and the increasing function of the buyer unit marketing expenditures in the complete information model. For the given the joint probability distributions of the parameters in the demand function and the parameters of the seller costs, the buyer and the seller make decisions recording to the maximization of the respective expected profit, and acquire the expressions of the decision variables which are similar to the results of complete information in the incomplete information model.