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多中心合作下水权转让合约机制设计——以哈密地区为例 被引量:2

A Polycentric-Cooperative Mode and Contracting Mechanism Design in Water Transfer:A Case of Hami
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摘要 在极端气候变化和各类污染加剧的环境下,日益增加的水资源需求与有限的水资源总量之间的矛盾不断激化。通过水权转让可实现水资源的二次配置和优化,但由于存在利益转移和变动,导致转让过程中多主体利益的协调问题十分突出。本文从多主体合作的角度出发提出多中心合作模式,避免传统补偿模式的弊端。本文通过博弈分析界定水权转让过程中的利益关系和均衡解,进而得出多中心合作的合约内容,实现两个目标:一方面从利益协调角度对转让各主体的收益函数进行改进,另一方面,通过合约设计缓解或消除主体之间的利益冲突矛盾。在提升各主体收益、降低交易成本的同时,结合哈密地区水权转让的实现过程进行分析,得出多中心合作模式能够更好的改善水权转让利益关系,提高转让效率。 With economic development,the contradiction between rapidly increasing water demand and limited water supply becomes serious.Furthermore,the quantity of water decreased due to climate change and different types of water pollution.Water transfer is an alternative to address the secondary allocation of water resources,which could improve the water use efficiency.However,it also resulted in a series of problems.From the perspective of multi-agent cooperation,this paper presents a new mode in water transfer called the Polycentric-Cooperative mode(PC mode).This mode is based on the multi-cooperation theory which reconstructs the relationships among the government,market,and the public.The PC mode obviates direct conflicts between the supplier and the demander by enhancing their initiatives and improving their profits.Specifically,this paper investigates the interest relationship in water transfer and the Nash equilibrium of this game.The PC mode was built,with a safeguard mechanism being constructed,i.e.,the multi-contracting mechanism of water transfer consisting of a set of contracting.The multi-contracting mechanism contains the apportioning costs contracting,the profits sharing contracting,the information exchange contracting,and the supervision and punishment contracting.The contracting not only offers a constraint on the agents’behavior,but also prompts the agents to develop their cognitive skills of water resources management.The PC mode was applied to water transfer in the Hami area located in Western China.The city covers 14.30 million square meters and the annual rainfall is less than 40 mm.Water resources are very rare over there.The per capita occupancy volume is no more than 1500 cubic meters.In order to acquire detailed knowledge of the Hami region,relevant data and information of water management and transfer were collected.Results indicate that the PC mode appears to be able to reduce the transaction cost and encourage people to establish cooperative relationships during the process of water transfer.There are two improvements in the new mode:one is enhancing the profits;the other one is improving and developing the interest relations.Based on the case of Hami,this mode can reduce deficiencies involved in traditional modes,generally increasing all agents’profits and reducing the transaction costs of water transfer.
作者 邓敏 王慧敏
出处 《资源科学》 CSSCI CSCD 北大核心 2012年第1期114-119,共6页 Resources Science
基金 国家社会科学基金项目(编号:10AJY005 10CGL069) 国家973计划项目子专题(编号:2010CB951104) 博士后基金(编号:20100471372) 水利部公益性行业科研项目(编号:200901068)
关键词 多中心合作 合约 水权转让 交易成本 Polycentric; Contracting; Water transfer; Transaction costs;
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参考文献16

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二级参考文献40

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