摘要
企业公益捐赠可以看成一个博弈问题,其参与人由企业和公益机构构成。运用博弈论的方法分析捐赠企业之间的捐赠行为博弈和捐赠额度博弈,分别求出完全信息动态条件下企业公益捐赠行为博弈和捐赠额度博弈的子博弈精炼纳什均衡解。
Corporate donation behavior can be regarded as a game issue, in which the participants are corporations and commonweal agencies. In this paper, donation behavior game and donation amount game were analyzed by the way of game theory, and sub-game refining Nash equilibrium solution was solved under the dynamic condition of complete information.
出处
《青岛科技大学学报(社会科学版)》
2011年第4期70-72,共3页
Journal of Qingdao University of Science and Technology(Social Sciences)
关键词
企业
公益捐赠
博弈分析
corporation
commonweal donation
game analysis