林权抵押借贷双方博弈行为分析

On Game Behavior of Both Sides on Forest Property Rights Mortgage Loan

南方集体林业产权制度改革以来,林农经营林业积极性普遍提高,为了解决林农林业经营过程的资金短缺与"融资难"问题,国家开展了林权抵押贷款业务。针对我国林权抵押贷款业务发展过程,从博弈角度探讨林权抵押借贷双方存在的风险、分析了林权抵押、担保机制的形成过程与效果,建立林农或林业企业融资方与金融机构投资方之间的博弈行为模型,并得出贷款利息、抵押物的价值、信用机制是影响林权抵押借贷双方行为的重要影响因素,最后根据影响因素提出风险防范的有效措施。

Since the reform of collective forest property rights system in southern China, farmers are becoming more enthusiastic about forestry management enthusiasm. In order to solve the shortage of funds and ＂financing difficulties＂ in forestry management confronting farmers, the country has carried out the forest property rights mortgage loan. Aiming at development of this business in China, this article explored the risk of both sides of the mortgaged forest property rights through the game theory, analyzed the forming process, he effect and the guarantee mechanism of such mortgage. It established the game behavior model between farmers or forestry corporation, the financiers and financial institutions, the investors. The result indicated that loan interest, the value of the collateral, and the credit mechanism are the important affecting factors. Finally, based on the study of the affecting factors, it proposed some effective measures to reduce the risk.