可追溯制度下食品安全的责任激励探讨

The Liability Incentives of Food Safety in the Traceability System

本研究主要是对质量可追溯制度下食品供应链主体的责任激励进行理论研究,为进一步的实证研究提供理论依据。在一个由农户、农产品加工企业、经销商和消费者组成的传统供应链中,建立模型进行数理推导,利用比较静态的方法对供应链各主体的责任激励进行分析。通过分析得出:在其他条件一定的情况下,供应链中各主体的努力程度越大,其提供安全食品的责任激励越大;可追溯水平越高,供应链各主体提供安全食品的责任激励越大;经销商、加工企业和农户的数量越大,其提供安全食品的责任激励越小,但是,经销商、加工企业和农户数量越大时,搭便车问题越严重,增加可追溯性对供应链各主体提供安全食品的责任激励越大。由分析结果可知,可追溯性具有创造责任激励的特征,并且可追溯的可能结果是纵向协调和一体化。

This paper was mainly to analysis the liability incentives of the main body of the supply chain in the traceability system, and provide a framework for empirical analysis. This artide develope a formal model, by making liability feasible, traceability causes the degree of food safety to increase. This paper model a stylized marketing chain composed of farmers, marketers, firms and consumers,use of comparative static approach to analysis the supply chain responsibility to stimulate the body. The model explores in detail the relationships between traceability and the provision of food safety： the greater the degree of the main efforts and the greater were the liability incentives to supply safer food; the higher the levels of traceability and the greater the liability incentives to supply safer food; the larger the number of farmers, marketers and firms its responsibility to provide safe food incentive was smaller, then the larger the number of farmers, marketers and firms, the larger was the free-rider problem and the greater were the liability incentives to supply safer food provided by increase the traceability. The model captured some important features of the creation of liability incentives through better traceability. And a potential consequence of the current trend in seeking better traceability was an increase in vertical coordination and integration.