长期通胀的成因：基于政治利益交换视角的解读

Causes of Long-term Inflation:A Political Interest Exchange Perspective

现有的"恩格尔系数—输入性通胀引发论"和中央银行独立性差异引发论,对于各国长期通胀率存在显著差异的问题并不具备令人信服的解释力。从公共选择学派的"政治利益交换"概念出发,通过构建包括富人阶层(利益集团)、穷人阶层和执政党的三方博弈模型,在理论上得出一国长期通胀率会随基尼系数增加而呈现倒U型的结论。并通过三个组别(共34个国家)的非平衡面板模型进行了检验,理论和实证结果表明利益集团的存在及其游说和寻租行为是诱发各国长期通胀率存在显著差异的主要原因。

Why governments of democratic states always raise inflation？ Why long-term inflation rates among different countries or regions are so divergent？ This article builds a trilateral game model involving the rich,the poor and the ruling party and finds that distribution of national income is key to the questions.It is also found that Gini index has an inverse-U-shape effect on long-term inflation rates.The conclusions are confirmed by an empirical test involving three groups with a panel data of 34 countries.