摘要
Stackelberg竞争条件下,面对东道国进口关税政策的保护,拥有技术优势的跨国公司是否会选择向东道国竞争企业进行技术授权,与它们进入市场的顺序有关,而且会对东道国社会福利产生不同的影响。当跨国公司作为先行者进入市场东道国企业随后进入时,不会选择进行技术授权;而当东道国企业率先进入市场跨国公司随后进入时,跨国公司会选择进行技术授权,此时能提高自身利润而不会降低东道国的社会福利水平。
In the circumstance of Stackelberg competition, whether the MNCs with technology advantage will choose to license their superior technology to the rival enterprises when facing the host country＇s import tariff is subject to the sequence of their entry into the market, which may have different effects on the social welfare of the host country. The MNCs will not choose technology licensing as a first mover into the host country＇s market, whereas they will license their technology when stepping into the market following the host country＇s enterprises because it will increase profits without lowering the host country＇s social welfare.
出处
《山东财政学院学报》
2012年第1期82-89,共8页
Journal of Shandong Finance Institute
关键词
技术授权
技术引进
进口关税
社会福利
technology licensing
technology import
import tariff
social welfare
