摘要
近年来我国进行证券投资的上市公司越来越多,上市公司投资短视行为日趋严重。针对我国上市公司热衷短期证券投资的现象,笔者重点对管理者基于自身利益的上市公司短视行为进行分析。本文选取2007年~2009年的我国上市公司为样本进行实证研究。通过研究,发现大量上市公司管理者存在投资短视行为;管理者年龄、经营能力对这种行为影响较大,并呈显著的负相关关系;而管理者薪酬、管理者持股比例与投资短视不存在显著的关系。
In recent years, there are more and more listed companies investing in securities and their investment myopia has become increasingly serious. In the light of the short - term securities investment of listed companies of our country, the authors analyzed the my- opia behavior of listed companies whose managers consider their own benefits. The authors made an empirical research using the listed companies of our country from 2007 to 2009 as samples. The descriptive statistical analysis and empirical study found that a large num- ber of managers of these companies have investment myopia behavior. Managers' age and managing capacity have significant impact on such myopic behavior and the relationship between them is significantly negative. However, the salaries of managers and the shareholding ratio of managers are not clearly related to investment myopia.
出处
《经济经纬》
CSSCI
北大核心
2012年第1期137-141,共5页
Economic Survey
基金
广东高校优秀青年创新人才培育计划项目(wym09050)
中央高校基本科研业务费专项资金10JYB2053
关键词
管理者
短视
证券投资
manager
myopia
securities investment