食品安全信息披露的博弈分析

The Game for Food Safety Information Disclosure

食品质量安全信息披露不足,导致消费者难以分辨食品的安全性,不能对市场中的食品产生信任。本文建立消费者与生产者的信号博弈模型并找寻了动态均衡路径,分析认为:食品生产企业要获得消费者信任并实现与低质量企业完全分离,必须披露更多的质量安全信息,同时高质量企业披露安全信息对企业有利。通过比较国外为获得消费者信任而加强食品安全信息披露的情况,指出现阶段国内食品安全信息披露的不足,提出引导高质量企业进行更多信息披露、加强信息沟通交流和落实信息披露机制的建议。

Lack of food safety information disclosure caused consumers difficult to identify the food safety and trust the food business. This paper used signaling game model to analyze the game between consumers and producers and found a dynamic equilibrium path, stated that in order to achieve a completely separating equilibrium and get consumer confidence, companies must disclose more information about the food quality and safety, and high - quality companies disclose safety information could get profit. This paper analyzed how foreign countries through enhance food information disclosure obtain consumer confidence, pointed out some defects of food safety information disclosure in domestic, and suggested govern- ment should guide high - quality enterprises disclose more safety information, strengthen safety information communication and implementation the mechanism of information disclosure