薪酬委员会独立性与更高的经理人报酬—业绩敏感度——基于薪酬辩护假说的分析和检验

The Independence of Compensation Committees and the Higher Reward Given to Managers: the Sensitivity of Performance——An Analysis and a Test Both Based on the Hypothesis of the Justifying Compensation

本文提出并初步实证检验了"薪酬辩护假说"。首先,本文论证提出了薪酬辩护假说,并基于它提出了薪酬辩护假说之子假说——当经理人有着薪酬辩护需求和较强能力影响公司薪酬政策制定时,在薪酬辩护净效用增加的情形下会通过经理人报酬—业绩敏感度的提高来为薪酬做"结果正当性"辩护。本文对此进行了检验,结果发现:在经理人薪酬辩护需求强烈的国有控股上市公司中,相对于经理人没有兼任薪酬委员会委员的企业,经理人兼任薪酬委员会委员的企业经理人报酬—业绩敏感度显著更高,且经理人兼任薪酬委员会委员与更高的报酬—业绩敏感度之关联主要出现在相对薪酬较高、相对业绩较好和公司所在地区市场化程度相对较低的公司之中,这说明经理人报酬—业绩敏感度之提高是出于经理人薪酬辩护之需,是经理人自利行为的表现。本文为经理人的薪酬辩护假说提供了初步的经验证据。需指出的是,虽然本文的假说推断和发现与主流代理理论预期不一致,但本文的研究并不意味着从经济后果来看,经理人兼任薪酬委员会委员的国有控股上市公司代理成本更高。

In this paper, we have put forward and preliminarily and empirically tested the 'Justifying Compensation Hypothe-sis' (JCH). First of all, we have, in this paper, put forward the JCH, and, on this basis, put forward our hypothesisabout the Son of the JCH: when managers have the demand for justifying compensation (JC) and relatively great abilityto impact on the establishment of policies for company' s reward, and when the net effect of the JC increases, managerswill increase the degree of the sensitivity of reward-performance to justify 'the justification of the results'. We haveexamined the above-mentioned 'Son' and discovered that, in the nation- controlled listed companies in which manag-ers' demand for JC is eager, compared with firms in which managers do not hold a concurrent post of being a memberof the reward committee, the degree of the sensitivity of reward-performance of managers who hold a concurrent post ofbeing a member of the reward committee is obviously much higher, that the relationship between managers holdingsuch a post and the still higher degree of the sensitivity of reward-performance finds its expression mainly in compa-nies that give high pay to their employees and have relatively better performance and whose location is the area wherethe degree of commercialization is relatively low, which shows that the increase in managers' degree of the sensitivity of reward-performance is because of managers' demand for the JC, and that increase mentioned above is an expres- sion of managers' selfishness. In this paper, we have offered some preliminary experiential proofs. What should be pointed out is that, although the deduction and the finding of the hypothesis in this paper are different from the antici- pation of the agents theory of the mainstream, the results of our study do not mean that, considered from the economic consequence, still higher is the agent cost of national controlling listed companies in which managers hold a concurrent post of being a member of the reward committee.