机构投资者能改进上市公司高管的薪酬激励吗?

Can Institutional Investors Improve the Incentive Compensation for Corporate Executives of Listed Companies?

次贷危机爆发以来，公司高管的巨额薪酬成为众矢之的。随着我国机构投资者的迅速崛起，市场对机构投资者改进上市公司治理寄予了厚望。我国的机构投资者能否对上市公司高管的薪酬激励和股权激励产生积极影响是本文关注的重点。本文选取2004-2008年度的上市公司作为样本，运用线性概率模型、Probit、Logit、Tobit以及OLS等回归方法对机构持股和上市公司高管薪酬激励，特别是股权激励的关系进行实证检验。实证结果表明中国的机构投资者并未有效限制高管股权激励和固定薪酬的增长，对于薪酬设计的改善作用也有待加强，机构股东积极主义在中国还有待加强。

Since the outbreak of the credit crisis, the sky-high salary enjoyed by corporate executives has become the public enemy. As the institutional investors in China are thriving in recent years, the market has placed great expectation on their role in the improvement of corporate governance. Thus this paper devotes itself to discussing whether institutional investors in China could bring positive influence to compensation mechanism and equity incentive of corporate executives. Using data of listed companies from 2004 to 2008, this paper applies linear probability model, Probit, Logit, Tobit and OLS to conduct empirical tests on the relationship between institutional share-holding and compensation incentive, especially equity incentive. The empirical results suggest that institutional investors in China failed to restrain either the growth of equity incentive or fixed salary of corporate executive and their improvement impact on compensation design is also far from perfect. That means there is a long way for institutional shareholders activism to strive on.