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网络环境下供应链采购道德风险的演化分析 被引量:5

Evolutionary Analysis of Moral Hazard in Supply Chain Procurement under Network Environment
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摘要 供应链采购过程中的道德风险会严重影响企业采购预期目标的实现。基于采购行为的复杂性和多样性,对交易主体进行划分,构建了一次性采购和重复性采购的群体演化博弈模型,分析了企业信誉和诚信交易的影响因素。研究结果表明:采购交易行为诚信与否取决于所获利益、惩罚程度、信誉差异、交易机率以及交易次数,最后分析并提出了研究结果的现实含义。 Moral hazard in the supply chain procurement process seriously affects the realization of the procurement target.This paper divides principal transactions based on the complexity and diversity of procurement behaviors and proposes one-time procurement evolutionary model and repetitive procurement evolutionary model.Then it makes a duplicated analysis on impact factors of business reputation and honest transaction.The results show that the honest behaviors of procurement transactions depend on benefit gain,punishment degree, reputation difference,trading probability and trading times.Finally this paper analyzes and proposes its practical significance.
作者 柴国荣 赵雷
出处 《工业工程与管理》 北大核心 2011年第6期30-34,49,共6页 Industrial Engineering and Management
基金 国家自然科学基金资助项目(70702013 71072070) 教育部"新世纪优秀人才支持计划"(NCET-08-0263) 中央高校基本科研业务费重点项目(11LZUJBWZD001)
关键词 供应链网络 采购 企业信誉 道德风险 演化博弈 supply chain network procurement corporate reputation moral hazard evolutionary game
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参考文献23

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二级参考文献129

共引文献1095

同被引文献73

  • 1郭士正,卢震,黄小原.信息非对称态的供应链生产营销协作[J].工业工程与管理,2004,9(6):37-40. 被引量:6
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